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Articles on the European Constitution
The Federal Future of Europe: From the European Community to the European Union.
Dusan SidjanskiISBN: 0-472-11075-6
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
Pub. Date: September 2000The Federal Approach to the European Union or The Quest for an Unprecedented European Federalism
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By Dusan Sidjanski |
Dusan Sidjanski, Founder of the Department of Political Science at the University of Geneva, President of the European Centre for Culture and special adviser to the President of the European Commission *
The momentum generated by the European Convention on the Constitution has dissipated, to the disappointment of many Europeans and to the chagrin of federalists. The shock to the system has been compounded by widespread unemployment and economic sluggishness that in itself is being aggravated by fears related to globalisation. The European Commission’s President José Manuel Barroso, has made it clear that he stands ready to relaunch the economy and strengthen resolve in the face of globalisation, and he has done much to encourage debate on the future of the European institutions.
Indeed, it is now open season on debating the future of the Union: Europe
has become an issue not just for the political elite, but for EU citizens
as a whole. In this sense, the work of the Convention is not dead. It is now
up to Europeans at all levels and of all opinions, from eurosceptics to committed
federalists, to reinject life into the institutional reform process. European
and national institutions as well as regional and local bodies have a part
to play in rekindling public interest. The European Union is now engaged in
the politicisation and democratisation of its decision-making mechanism this
is in itself a positive transformation.
*The views expressed here are strictly personal
In general terms, the Constitutional process is headed in the right direction.
European federalists have given wide support to the project, even though many
have had to stifle their own doubts about some of its aspects. But whatever
the eventual shape of Europe’s future Constitution, its wording must
in the first place reflect the views of the EU nation states that have to
ratify it, and secondly it must take note of the objections that European
citizens voiced at the time of the mid-2005 referendums.
The eventual Constitution must be readable and transparent, and must reflect democratic values. The Convention that produced its ill-fated forerunner had careened from one compromise to another, and thus resulted in a voluminous text that Europe’s citizens found inaccessible, if not incomprehensible. Any future text should be reduced to its bare essentials; the synthesis would include statements on the Constitution’s values, priorities, and objectives, but the essential core would be outlines of the structure, functions and scope of the European institutions, together with a description of the sharing of powers between the institutions, and between the EU’s member states and regions. The overall effect would be to clearly define the architecture for the separation of powers that would at the same time amount to a dynamic equilibrium of institutions within a democratic system.
The Union’s federal vocation is clear, and the preamble to the present constitution is concise and strong. It sets out values and principles, delineates citizens’ rights, and affirms the principle of non-discrimination, the primacy of European law and the Union’s legal character. The preamble also claims ownership of the principle of federalist subsidiarity through the phrase, “the motto of the Union: United in diversity”.
It was Part III of the Constitutional treaty, as presently drafted, that was ravaged by governments’ demands. It re-states the common policies and market rules of current treaties and is thus written more in the style of a treaty than of a constitution. The Constitution, as such, should be limited to defining the objectives and broad directions of common policies, and should set out the decision-making process that would facilitate this. Formulating the common policies in detail should be left to the institutions and political bodies that would be affected. Meanwhile, all those norms that are part of the community fabric would remain in force to provide the basis for Commission initiatives. In the same spirit, the principles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights would be written into the Constitution but the detailed text would be placed in an annex to the Constitution.
The European Union’s institutions already lie at the heart of the present Constitution, and will remain there. The European Parliament emerged strengthened from the constitutional development process. Over and above its legislative and budgetary functions, and its powers of political control over the Commission, the Parliament is to elect the President of the European College, and by doing so is to consolidate its authority. Through the Commission, Parliament is exercising a power of initiative on behalf of one million citizens. It can now receive petitions, name European mediators and hold hearings or set up commissions of inquiry to sound out the heartbeat of European society.
One innovation is that the President of the European Council is now elected by qualified majority vote. The President directs and coordinates the work of the European Council. He represents the Union in external affairs at head-of-state or government level for foreign policy or common security matters, without prejudicing the work of the European Union’s Ministry of foreign affairs. In the light of experiences such as the Yugoslavian and Iraq crises, and in major policy discussions, the European Council's role is certainly key.
There is now a need to buttress the consistency of the European Council by giving it a presidency with more continuity. It would be preferable for it to increasingly base its decisions on Commission proposals by the use of qualified majority voting. As the best way to guarantee consistency of EU policies. It would fall to the Council and Commission presidents - assisted by the European Minister of foreign affairs - to represent the Union at such highest levels, as the G-8 meetings. In this way, the artificial separation that exists at EU level between foreign affairs and external relations would be rendered obsolete and the Union’s influence increased at global level.
The idea of the post of European Minister of foreign affairs was born out of concerns that EU external policies lacked both effectiveness and consistency. Some functional doubling up will persist in the person of the European Minister who assumes both the permanent presidency of the Council of foreign affairs ministers, and the Vice-presidency of the Commission. The Minister is thus condemned to reconcile intergovernmental considerations and the concerns of the Commission which, in other respects, participates in the Union’s diplomatic service. Furthermore, the Minister’s collective responsibility is confined to the functions devolved to the Commission - to the exclusion of common foreign and security policy, and European policy on security and defence - of intergovernmental predominance. Also, insofar as the Minister puts forward proposals on his or her own, the Minister’s activities in these “high policy” domains are subject to European Parliament control. The European Minister should act in the name of the Commission, thus exercising his or her political responsibility, and avoid preserving shelters from democratic control, whether national and European. European public opinion is demanding a common foreign policy as a priority.
In the European Constitution, the Council of Ministers continues to symbolise a certain confusion of powers. There is an agglomeration of several forms of governmental competence, each with legislative and budgetary powers. In a co-decision with the European Parliament, the Convention posed the idea of a legislative Council mandated to formulate European laws from proposals from the Commission, and to approve the community budget. National governmental influences induced a return to the starting situation. This was a disappointment for the federalists who were seeing the legislative Council as a step towards creating a Second Chamber of the States. On the other hand, one can only be pleased at the extension of qualified majority voting, involving the majority of member states representing at least 65% of the EU population. This double demand reflects the federative principle of double representation: the member states, and the people.
One of the major questions has been the composition and weighting of the Commission in the new institutional balance. Reducing the Commission to 15 members, following the “equal rotation system” written in the Constitution, has not aroused debate, much to my astonishment. Now the formula that has been adopted risks reducing one or more Commissioners from the major member states to taking on a marginal role. The consequences of this would be a weakening of the Commission’s authority. Furthermore, the role of a Commissioner without voting rights would not attract those major political figures that the European College needs so badly. Would it not be wise to plan a transition period, starting with a Commission of 25 or more, and for the President have complete authority to organise the transition in the best way? Besides, organising internally by related sectors is an old practice. The responsibility for this is often given to Commission vice-presidents, under the eye of the first President who facilitates the collegial decision-making. The Constitution strengthens the authority of the Commission President elected by the European Parliament, and who enjoys the double legitimacy of both the member states and European parliamentarians. The Commission and its president - along with the European Parliament - are the best guarantors of the common European interest, and maintaining the democratic balance.
The Constitution affirms the practice of consulting interest groups and the concerned public, increasing the proximity to the centres of decision-making of such groups and individuals. The Economic and Social Committee with the Regional Committee offer structural access at institutional level. The latter is composed of regional and local elected representatives, and seems to have a political future. It could reduce the distance between EU institutions, the regions and local groups, by developing citizen participation at various levels. This is an essential aspect of any federative community. The Union has made significant advances in the name of flexibility, to which the euro and Schengen are testimony. These advances came about through a group of member States assuming a pioneer role that saw the possibility of attracting in their wake those did not have the will or means to join in at the start. This process suggests a promising path for the future.
The recent referendums on the Constitution strongly highlighted the participation
deficit, and the urgent need to associate citizens more closely with the European
construction project. At the same time, the referendums showed the à
la carte nature of the ratifications and exposed the inconsistencies within
them. Some results threw up demands that were beyond those that international
organisations would normally expect to deal with. Some plebiscites used parliamentary
procedures, others used referendums as such, and staged debates on Europe
that were polluted by internal political issues; most of the ratifications
were damaged by the veto of a small minority. This is why there is a desire
to Europeanise the adoption of the European Constitution by using common procedures.
At the moment, this is nothing more than a federalist dream.